Pakistan and the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan

September 28, 2010 | 0855 GMT

By George Friedman


By George Friedman
Bob Woodward has released another book, this one on the debate over Afghanistan strategy in the Obama administration. As all his books do, the book has riveted Washington. It reveals that intense debate occurred over what course to take, that the president sought alternative strategies and that compromises were reached. But while knowing the details of these things is interesting, what would have been shocking is if they hadn’t taken place.
It is interesting to reflect on the institutional inevitability of these disagreements. The military is involved in a war. It is institutionally and emotionally committed to victory in the theater of combat. It will demand all available resources for executing the war under way. For a soldier who has bled in that war, questioning the importance of the war is obscene. A war must be fought relentlessly and with all available means.
But while the military’s top generals and senior civilian leadership are responsible for providing the president with sound, clearheaded advice on all military matters including the highest levels of grand strategy, they are ultimately responsible for the pursuit of military objectives to which the commander-in-chief directs them. Generals must think about how to win the war they are fighting. Presidents must think about whether the war is worth fighting. The president is responsible for America’s global posture. He must consider what an unlimited commitment to a particular conflict might mean in other regions of the world where forces would be unavailable.
A president must take a more dispassionate view than his generals. He must calculate not only whether victory is possible but also the value of the victory relative to the cost. Given the nature of the war in Afghanistan, U.S. President Barack Obama and Gen. David Petraeus — first the U.S. Central Command chief and now the top commander in Afghanistan — had to view it differently. This is unavoidable. This is natural. And only one of the two is ultimately in charge.
The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare

In thinking about Afghanistan, it is essential that we begin by thinking about the nature of guerrilla warfare against an occupying force. The guerrilla lives in the country. He isn’t going anywhere else, as he has nowhere to go. By contrast, the foreigner has a place to which he can return. This is the core weakness of the occupier and the strength of the guerrilla. The former can leave and in all likelihood, his nation will survive. The guerrilla can’t. And having alternatives undermines the foreigner’s will to fight regardless of the importance of the war to him.
The strategy of the guerrilla is to make the option to withdraw more attractive. In order to do this, his strategic goal is simply to survive and fight on whatever level he can. His patience is built into who he is and what he is fighting for. The occupier’s patience is calculated against the cost of the occupation and its opportunity costs, thus, while troops are committed in this country, what is happening elsewhere?
Tactically, the guerrilla survives by being elusive. He disperses in small groups. He operates in hostile terrain. He denies the enemy intelligence on his location and capabilities. He forms political alliances with civilians who provide him supplies and intelligence on the occupation forces and misleads the occupiers about his own location. The guerrilla uses this intelligence network to decline combat on the enemy’s terms and to strike the enemy when he is least prepared. The guerrilla’s goal is not to seize and hold ground but to survive, evade and strike, imposing casualties on the occupier. Above all, the guerrilla must never form a center of gravity that, if struck, would lead to his defeat. He thus actively avoids anything that could be construed as a decisive contact.
The occupation force is normally a more conventional army. Its strength is superior firepower, resources and organization. If it knows where the guerrilla is and can strike before the guerrilla can disperse, the occupying force will defeat the guerrilla. The occupier’s problems are that his intelligence is normally inferior to that of the guerrillas; the guerrillas rarely mass in ways that permit decisive combat and normally can disperse faster than the occupier can pinpoint and deploy forces against them; and the guerrillas’ superior tactical capabilities allow them to impose a constant low rate of casualties on the occupier. Indeed, the massive amount of resources the occupier requires and the inflexibility of a military institution not solely committed to the particular theater of operations can actually work against the occupier by creating logistical vulnerabilities susceptible to guerrilla attacks and difficulty adapting at a rate sufficient to keep pace with the guerrilla. The occupation force will always win engagements, but that is never the measure of victory. If the guerrillas operate by doctrine, defeats in unplanned engagements will not undermine their basic goal of survival. While the occupier is not winning decisively, even while suffering only some casualties, he is losing. While the guerrilla is not losing decisively, even if suffering significant casualties, he is winning. Since the guerrilla is not going anywhere, he can afford far higher casualties than the occupier, who ultimately has the alternative of withdrawal.
The asymmetry of this warfare favors the guerrilla. This is particularly true when the strategic value of the war to the occupier is ambiguous, where the occupier does not possess sufficient force and patience to systematically overwhelm the guerrillas, and where either political or military constraints prevent operations against sanctuaries. This is a truth as relevant to David’s insurgency against the Philistines as it is to the U.S. experience in Vietnam or the Russian occupation of Afghanistan.
There has long been a myth about the unwillingness of Americans to absorb casualties for very long in guerrilla wars. In reality, the United States fought in Vietnam for at least seven years (depending on when you count the start and stop) and has now fought in Afghanistan for nine years. The idea that Americans can’t endure the long war has no empirical basis. What the United States has difficulty with — along with imperial and colonial powers before it — is a war in which the ability to impose one’s will on the enemy through force of arms is lacking and when it is not clear that the failure of previous years to win the war will be solved in the years ahead.
Far more relevant than casualties to whether Americans continue a war is the question of the conflict’s strategic importance, for which the president is ultimately responsible. This divides into several parts. This first is whether the United States has the ability with available force to achieve its political goals through prosecuting the war (since all war is fought for some political goal, from regime change to policy shift) and whether the force the United States is willing to dedicate suffices to achieve these goals. To address this question in Afghanistan, we have to focus on the political goal.
The Evolution of the U.S. Political Goal in Afghanistan

Washington’s primary goal at the initiation of the conflict was to destroy or disrupt al Qaeda in Afghanistan to protect the U.S. homeland from follow-on attacks to 9/11. But if Afghanistan were completely pacified, the threat of Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism would remain at issue because it is no longer just an issue of a single organization — al Qaeda — but a series of fragmented groups conducting operations in Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, North Africa, Somalia and elsewhere.
Today, al Qaeda is simply one manifestation of the threat of this transnational jihadist phenomenon. It is important to stop and consider al Qaeda — and the transnational jihadist phenomenon in general — in terms of guerrillas, and to think of the phenomenon as a guerrilla force in its own right operating by the very same rules on a global basis. Thus, where the Taliban apply guerrilla principles to Afghanistan, today’s transnational jihadist applies them to the Islamic world and beyond. The transnational jihadists are not leaving and are not giving up. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, they will decline combat against larger American forces and strike vulnerable targets when they can.
There are certainly more players and more complexity to the global phenomenon than in a localized insurgency. Many governments across North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia have no interest in seeing these movements set up shop and stir up unrest in their territory. And al Qaeda’s devolution has seen frustrations as well as successes as it spreads. But the underlying principles of guerrilla warfare remain at issue. Whenever the Americans concentrate force in one area, al Qaeda disengages, disperses and regroups elsewhere and, perhaps more important, the ideology that underpins the phenomenon continues to exist. The threat will undoubtedly continue to evolve and face challenges, but in the end, it will continue to exist along the lines of the guerrilla acting against the United States.
There is another important way in which the global guerrilla analogy is apt. STRATFOR has long held that Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism does not represent a strategic, existential threat to the United States. While acts of transnational terrorism target civilians, they are not attacks — have not been and are not evolving into attacks — that endanger the territorial integrity of the United States or the way of life of the American people. They are dangerous and must be defended against, but transnational terrorism is and remains a tactical problem that for nearly a decade has been treated as if it were the pre-eminent strategic threat to the United States.
Nietzsche wrote that, “The most fundamental form of human stupidity is forgetting what we were trying to do in the first place.” The stated U.S. goal in Afghanistan was the destruction of al Qaeda. While al Qaeda as it existed in 2001 has certainly been disrupted and degraded, al Qaeda’s evolution and migration means that disrupting and degrading it — to say nothing of destroying it — can no longer be achieved by waging a war in Afghanistan. The guerrilla does not rely on a single piece of real estate (in this case Afghanistan) but rather on his ability to move seamlessly across terrain to evade decisive combat in any specific location. Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism is not centered on Afghanistan and does not need Afghanistan, so no matter how successful that war might be, it would make little difference in the larger fight against transnational jihadism.
Thus far, the United States has chosen to carry on fighting the war in Afghanistan. As al Qaeda has fled Afghanistan, the overall political goal for the United States in the country has evolved to include the creation of a democratic and uncorrupt Afghanistan. It is not clear that anyone knows how to do this, particularly given that most Afghans consider the ruling government of President Hamid Karzai — with which the United States is allied — as the heart of the corruption problem, and beyond Kabul most Afghans do not regard their way of making political and social arrangements to be corrupt.
Simply withdrawing from Afghanistan carries its own strategic and political costs, however. The strategic problem is that simply terminating the war after nine years would destabilize the Islamic world. The United States has managed to block al Qaeda’s goal of triggering a series of uprisings against existing regimes and replacing them with jihadist regimes. It did this by displaying a willingness to intervene where necessary. Of course, the idea that U.S. intervention destabilized the region raises the question of what regional stability would look like had it not intervened. The danger of withdrawal is that the network of relationships the United States created and imposed at the regime level could unravel if it withdrew. America would be seen as having lost the war, the prestige of radical Islamists and thereby the foundation of the ideology that underpins their movement would surge, and this could destabilize regimes and undermine American interests.
The political problem is domestic. Obama’s approval rating now stands at 42 percent. This is not unprecedented, but it means he is politically weak. One of the charges against him, fair or not, is that he is inherently anti-war by background and so not fully committed to the war effort. Where a Republican would face charges of being a warmonger, which would make withdrawal easier, Obama faces charges of being too soft. Since a president must maintain political support to be effective, withdrawal becomes even harder. Therefore, strategic analysis aside, the president is not going to order a complete withdrawal of all combat forces any time soon — the national (and international) political alignment won’t support such a step. At the same time, remaining in Afghanistan is unlikely to achieve any goal and leaves potential rivals like China and Russia freer rein.
The American Solution

The American solution, one that we suspect is already under way, is the Pakistanization of the war. By this, we do not mean extending the war into Pakistan but rather extending Pakistan into Afghanistan. The Taliban phenomenon has extended into Pakistan in ways that seriously complicate Pakistani efforts to regain their bearing in Afghanistan. It has created a major security problem for Islamabad, which, coupled with the severe deterioration of the country’s economy and now the floods, has weakened the Pakistanis’ ability to manage Afghanistan. In other words, the moment that the Pakistanis have been waiting for — American agreement and support for the Pakistanization of the war — has come at a time when the Pakistanis are not in an ideal position to capitalize on it.
In the past, the United States has endeavored to keep the Taliban in Afghanistan and the regime in Pakistan separate. (The Taliban movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not one and the same.) Washington has not succeeded in this regard, with the Pakistanis continuing to hedge their bets and maintain a relationship across the border. Still, U.S. opposition has been the single greatest impediment to Pakistan’s consolidation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and abandoning this opposition leaves important avenues open for Islamabad.
The Pakistani relationship to the Taliban, which was a liability for the United States in the past, now becomes an advantage for Washington because it creates a trusted channel for meaningful communication with the Taliban. Logic suggests this channel is quite active now.
The Vietnam War ended with the Paris peace talks. Those formal talks were not where the real bargaining took place but rather where the results were ultimately confirmed. If talks are under way, a similar venue for the formal manifestation of the talks is needed — and Islamabad is as good a place as any.
Pakistan is an American ally which the United States needs, both to balance growing Chinese influence in and partnership with Pakistan, and to contain India. Pakistan needs the United States for the same reason. Meanwhile, the Taliban wants to run Afghanistan. The United States has no strong national interest in how Afghanistan is run so long as it does not support and espouse transnational jihadism. But it needs its withdrawal to take place in a manner that strengthens its influence rather than weakens it, and Pakistan can provide the cover for turning a retreat into a negotiated settlement.
Pakistan has every reason to play this role. It needs the United States over the long term to balance against India. It must have a stable or relatively stable Afghanistan to secure its western frontier. It needs an end to U.S. forays into Pakistan that are destabilizing the regime. And playing this role would enhance Pakistan’s status in the Islamic world, something the United States could benefit from, too. We suspect that all sides are moving toward this end.
The United States isn’t going to defeat the Taliban. The original goal of the war is irrelevant, and the current goal is rather difficult to take seriously. Even a victory, whatever that would look like, would make little difference in the fight against transnational jihad, but a defeat could harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States needs a withdrawal that is not a defeat. Such a strategic shift is not without profound political complexity and difficulties. But the disparity between — and increasingly, the incompatibility of — the struggle with transnational terrorism and the war effort geographically rooted in Afghanistan is only becoming more apparent — even to the American public.

The likely future picture of global Islam

GHAYUR AYUB

WEEKEND MAGAZINE (September 25 2010): Recently, Muammar Gaddafi stated that "There are signs that Allah will grant victory to Islam in Europe without sword, without gun, without conquest. We don't need terrorists, we don't need homicide bombers. The 50 plus million Muslims (in Europe) will turn it into the Muslim continent within a few decades." Irrespective of his somersaults in global politics, he could be right this time.

The picture gets clearer if one looks at various research works on demographic changes of Western countries in relation to the Muslim immigration and their fertility rate. The average fertility rate per family amongst the Westerners is 1.65 as compared to the Muslims', which is 8.1. An interesting picture emerges when this is translated into demographic change. According to studies, it is known that in order for a culture to maintain itself for over 25 years, it has to keep a fertility rate of 2.11 children per family. Anything less than that would mean a decline in the culture. At the rate of 1.9, the reverse becomes difficult and it takes 80-100 years to correct itself. At 1.3 or less, the reversal becomes impossible. Keeping these figures in mind, let us study the culture growth rates of certain Western countries.

The figures of 2007 show that; in France, the fertility rate was 1.8; in England it was 1.6; in Greece 1.3; Germany 1.3; Italy 1.2; Spain 1.1; and in EU, as a whole with 31 countries, it was 1.38. These figures are indicative of a change in the demography of Europe in a few years. In other words; the European culture as we know it will cease to exist in the coming decades. Remember that we are talking of culture not the population, which has not declined because of immigration. Statistics show that since 1990, over 90% of immigration was from the Muslim countries.

As a result of this change; in France 30% of children age 20 years and below are Muslims. In big cities such as Paris and Marseille, the ratio goes up to 45%. In southern France there are more mosques than churches.

The situation in UK is not much different either. In the last 30 years, the Muslim population there has raised from 82,000 to 2.5 Millions, which is a 30 fold increase. There are over 1000 mosques, many of which were converted from churches. The situation remains identical in other major countries of Europe. For example, in the Netherland, 5% new-borns are Muslims and in the next 15 years, half of the population will be Muslims.

Keeping the demographic decline in view, the Germen government reported that, "The fall in the (German) population can no longer be stopped. Its downward spiral is no longer reversible." It further stated, "It will be a Muslim state by the year 2050".

In Belgium, 50% new-borns are Muslims and reportedly its Muslim population is around 25%. Its government recently announced that one third of all European children will be born to Muslim families by 2025. As a result of the high growth rate, the present 52 million Muslims in Europe will reach to 104 millions in 20 years. It is the same story in Russia. There are 23 million Muslims, living in that country, which ratios 1:5. It is calculated that soon 40% of Russian army will be Muslims.

In Canada, the FR is 1.6 against the required rate of 2.11, causing a gradual decline in non-Muslim population. Because of lenient immigration policies; from 2001 to 2006, the population increased by 1.6 million out of which 1.2 million were Muslim immigrants, shrinking the national ratio between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the US, until recently, the FR was 1.6. It increased to 2.11 with the Latino influx, but still fell short of the required number to sustain culture. Against this shortfall, the Muslim population in America rose from 100,000 in 1970 to 9,000,000 (9 million) in 2008. What will happen in the coming few decades, is anybody's guess.

Four years ago, a meeting of 24 countries from OIC was held in Chicago. It's communiqué mentioned that, "we must prepare ourselves for the reality that in 30 years, there will be 50 million Muslims living in America." That alarmed the Evangelicals and the Catholic church. The church recently confessed that Islam surpassed their membership numbers and with the current rate of growth, in 5-7 years it will be dominant religion of the world.

These are statistical facts, which portray the likely picture of Islam on the world map. And this makes the radical Christians and Jews worry to the core. As a result, they put their centuries-old rivalry on the side and came up with 'Judeo-Christian Fraternity' in recent years to counter the threat jointly. The Muslims should understand their concerns and put themselves in their shoes as to what would have been their response if the growth scale was reversed.

With one pretext or another, the right wingers in Judeo-Christianity have been struggling to diminish Muslims in more ways than one in the last few decades. Their struggle took various forms and shapes such as social, cultural, tribal, racial and religious. They did it with apparent designs of pursuing justice without being perceived as grievance. Having total control over world media they have been successful to a large extent but not enough to reverse the demographic trends.

For such a reversal, they need more than mere propaganda. To get the desired mathematical scales, they need to create situations in which;

-- Wars break out between Muslim countries where weapons of mass destruction supplied by the west are used.

-- Muslims take up arms against each other on the basis of sectarianism, ethnicity and even language.

-- Disastrous diseases are spread by artificially creating fatal viruses; or contaminating certain vaccines to spread lethal diseases. Some serious researchers believe that this venue was tried through small pox vaccination in 1970s and 1980s. Some blame spread of AIDS to a suspect vaccine programme involving Simian Immunodeficiency Virus found in the sooty mangabey (known as the white-collared monkey), which is indigenous to western Africa.

-- Spread poverty to lethal levels in the Third World countries with high percentage of Muslims.

In situations such as these, the political leaders of Muslim countries, with the support of Muslim scholars, philosophers and knowledgeable, should frame a comprehensive universal formula to counter the ill designs of their enemies, not by fighting with them but by;

-- Concentrating and improving on education, especially in science and technology.

-- Modernising the religious education in Madresschs, making English and science compulsory subjects.

-- Stop killing each other and the followers of other religions.

-- Banning hate literature and encouraging fraternal material in cultural, social and religious fields.

-- Educating the Muslim public through Friday congregations on how to live in harmony with tolerance and understanding.

The time is on the side of Muslims. All they need to do is to wait with compassion and patience and not to become tools in the hands of their enemies. Very soon, the world demographic picture is going to change in favour of Muslims, Insha'Allah.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2010 (Pakistan,s first financial daily)